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THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT, PROCESS
FEDERALISM AND THE CLEAR STATEMENT RULE
William P. Marshall*
INTRODUCTION
For years, the United States Supreme Court has steadfastly avoided the
issue of whether Congress may abrogate the states' eleventh amendment
immunity' from suit for damages in federal court. The court devised a
uniquely stringent mode of statutory construction as its escape device. In
each case the Court avoided the constitutional issue by holding that Congress
had not provided "clear and unmistakable" language in the governing statute
which would indicate the states were intended to be subject to federal
jurisdiction.
2
The Court again faced the issue of constitutional abrogation in a number
of cases decided during the 1988-1989 Supreme Court Term.' In one of those
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was provided by Tracey Burton.
1. The eleventh amendment provides that:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by citizens of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of a Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
2. Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2500 (1989) (Court required clear language in statute
to abrogate state's eleventh amendment immunity); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1987) (Congress failed to state an "unmistakably clear expres-
sion" to abrogate the eleventh amendment) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 242 (1985)); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) ("states may not be sued in
federal court ... unless Congress ... unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate immunity");
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) ("Congress may abrogate the
States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute"); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979)
("our cases consistently have required a clearer showing of congressional purpose to abrogate
eleventh amendment immunity"); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (waiver of state
immunity found only "where stated 'by the most express language or by such overwhelming
implication from the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction' ")
(quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)); Employees v. Missouri
Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973) ("It would also be surprising in the
present case to infer that Congress deprived Missouri of her constitutional immunity ...
[without] indicating in some way by clear language that the constitutional immunity was swept
away").
3. Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818, 2819 (1989)
(Court found that Congress had not clearly abrogated state's immunity under Bankruptcy code
and so denied trustee's action against state); Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 109 S. Ct. 2463,
2466-68 (1989) (Court awarded attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs in school desegregation
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cases, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 4 the Court finally did not evade the
abrogation issue on statutory construction grounds.' A five person majority
found the statute at issue in Union Gas to be unmistakably clear;6 under the
statute states were to be subject to suits for damages in federal court.'
The Court presented its long-awaited answer to the constitutional question,
however, as essentially a fait accompli. Arguing that its previous decisions
"mark[ed] a trail unmistakably leading to the conclusion that Congress may
permit suits against the States for money damages," 8 the Court held that
Congress did have the power to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment
immunity. 9 Furthermore, the Court, taking its previous cases to heart,
effectively constitutionalized its issue-avoidance mechanism. According to
the Court, the constitutional limit on the congressional power to abrogate
the states' eleventh amendment immunity was that Congress must do so by
"clear and unmistakable language" in the text of the governing statute. 0
The Court, in short, adopted what has been referred to as the "clear
statement rule.""
case who brought action against state under 42 U.S.C. § 1988); Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct.
2397, 2402 (1989) (Court found wording of Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §
1400, did not clearly abrogate state's eleventh amendment immunity so did not find state liable
to father of handicapped child who brought action against state's Department of Education
challenging the individualized education program established for his son as well as the appro-
priateness of administrative relief); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2278
(1989) (Court found wording of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604-9606, clearly made state liable
to plaintiff who sued state claiming that state was liable for environmental clean up of site
under 1986 SARA amendments to CERCLA).
4. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
5. Id. at 2278-79.
6. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
disagreed with the majority on the "clear language" issue. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2289-90
(White, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 2280. Union Gas concerned the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986) and the subsequent amendments found in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, which provides, inter alia for
liability of responsible parties for clean-up costs of hazardous waste sites. Those who may be
liable are "persons" and "owners or operators." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). "[Sltates" are included
within the definition of "persons." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). Other parts of the statute, however,
explicitly exclude states from liability. The majority consequently concluded that:
[Tlhe express inclusion of states within the statute's definition of 'persons,' and the
plain statement that states are to be considered 'owners or operators' in all but
very narrow circumstances, together convey a message of unmistakable clarity:
Congress intended that states be liable along with everyone else for clean-up costs
recoverable under CERCLA.
Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2278.
8. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2281.
9. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2281 (1989); Dellmuth v. Muth, 109
S. Ct. 2397, 2400 (1989); Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct.
2818, 2822 (1989).
10. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2277.
11. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Congress, The Supreme Court, and the Eleventh Amendment:
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I. A REVIEW OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT CASES DECIDED DURING
THE SUPREME COURT'S 1988-89 TERM
There are numerous unusual twists in the 1988-89 Term cases, especially
in Union Gas, that even a cursory review reveals. First, as Professor Chem-
erinsky suggests, the Court's holding in Union Gas seems particularly tenuous
because eight of the nine Justices on the Court have rejected the clear
statement formulation. 2 Four of the Justices believe that eleventh amendment
immunity only applies in diversity cases,"3 while four subscribe to the position
that the eleventh amendment reflects a substantive state immunity from
damages suits in federal court that cannot be overridden by Congress,'
4
except when Congress has acted pursuant to section five of the fourteenth
amendment." The adoption of the clear statement rule, then, was clearly
not a product of a commitment to a reasoned theoretical position.
Much of the cause of the Court's failure to come to grips with the
constitutional issues involved stems from the nature of Justice White's critical
swing vote concurrence in the Union Gas case.' 6 Ever seeking to avoid the
constitutional issue, Justice White vigorously argued that the statute in Union
Gas was not clear enough to subject the state to federal jurisdiction.'
7
However, having lost that battle he was at last forced to address the
constitutional issue. Here his adherence in previous cases to the clear state-
ment requirement took its toll. After having subscribed for so long that
Congress needed to provide clear and unambiguous language in order to
abrogate the states' immunity," Justice White was seemingly forced to
A Comment on the Decisions During the 1988-89 Term, 39 DE PAUL L. REV. 321 (1989); Field,
The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition
of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1250 (1978).
12. Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 333-34.
13. See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 253-61 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens share diversity theory with Justice Bren-
nan).
14. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2303 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting
in part) (Chief Justice Rehnquist as well as Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined Scalia's
opinion that eleventh amendment reflects constitutionally-based state immunity).
15. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (Court found eleventh amendment did
not bar petitioners class action suit under Title VII against state for discriminatory retirement
plan because section five of fourteenth amendment overrides the state's eleventh amendment
protections).
16. 109 S. Ct. at 2289-94.
17. Justice White did not "think that SARA's liability-limiting amendment to CERCLA
contain[ed] an 'unmistakably clear' statement by Congress that it wanted to abrogate the States'
solemn immunity to private suit under the Eleventh Amendment." Id. at 2294 (White, J.,
concurring) (quotations in text).
18. Justice White has consistently joined the Supreme Court decisions which have suggested
that abrogation of states eleventh amendment immunity may occur only where clear and
unmistakable language, or "unequivocal expression" of congressional intent exists within the
statute. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 495 (1987);
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 65-66 (1985); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
1989]
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conclude that Congress, in fact, had that power. His opinion, however, left
the rationale behind the constitutional issue adrift. Justice White simply
wrote: "I agree . . . that Congress has the authority under Article I to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states, although I do
not agree with much of [Justice Brennan's] reasoning."' 9
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, although commanding four votes, also
did not provide what could fairly be considered a commanding rationale.
20
Justice Brennan based his conclusion that Congress could abrogate states'
immunity on the contention that the states waived their sovereign immunity
when they agreed to enter into the federal union.2' Implied in this contention,
however, is that states are not immune to any suits based on federal law;
including those brought directly under the constitution without statutory
authority. As such, Justice Brennan's opinion marks a clear repudiation of
Hans v. Louisiana,22 which held that the states are immune to direct actions
under the Constitution.2 3 In contrast, Justice White, the critical fifth vote,
explicitly rejected the overruling of Hans.2 4 The only common ground be-
tween Justice Brennan's opinion and Justice White's concurrence, in short,
was the apparent reliance on the dicta in previous cases which held that a
clear statement was necessary to abrogate state immunity.
2
1
A second difficulty arising from the Court's resolution of the congressional
abrogation issue is the rather meager role it ascribes to the eleventh amend-
ment. The conclusion that the states' only protection from Congress is that
the latter must act with a "clear statement" essentially relegates the eleventh
amendment to a legislative draftsmanship provision. Normally, however, one
would think that constitutional amendments, particularly ones which over-
turn unpopular Supreme Court decisions, 26 are of greater consequence than
statutory drafting guidelines.
A third problem is that the combination of the result in Union Gas with
the Court's apparent reaffirmation of Hans v. Louisiana27 creates, at least
234, 242-45 (1985); Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 252 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring in part); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-106 (1979);
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343-49 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675-76 (1974);
Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280-84 (1973).
19. Union Gas 109 S. Ct. at 2295 (White, J., concurring).
20. Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens joined in Brennan's decision. Id. at 2275-86.
21. Id. at 2283-86. Justice Brennan also presented a doctrinal argument that Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), dictated the result in Union Gas. Id. at 2282. The Fitzpatrick
Court held that Congress might override states' eleventh amendment immunity under section
five of the fourteenth amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 429 U.S. at 456.
22. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
23. Id. at 10.
24. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2295 (White, J., concurring).
25. Justice White did not explicitly cite to this dicta in his brief discussion of the consti-
tutional issue.
26. The eleventh amendment was enacted in response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
27. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). As Professor Chemerinsky notes, there were five votes in Union Gas
to affirm the Hans decision. See Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 331.
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with respect to the eleventh amendment, a new hierarchy in the rights of
individuals to proceed against states for damages. Under the Court's ap-
proach, plaintiffs may pursue rights granted by Congress in federal court
against the states while rights granted directly under the Constitution may
be frustrated. The Court's approach, in short, entitles statutory rights to
more federal judicial enforcement than constitutional rights.2"
The most disturbing aspect of the 1988-89 cases, however, is that the
Court, in failing to provide a majority rationale and, instead, relying heavily
on dicta from previous cases, clearly did not grapple with the significance
of its prior decisions. As Professor Chemerinsky notes, the policies under-
lying the eleventh amendment debate involve "the major themes of consti-
tutional law." ' 29 It is for that reason that the debate surrounding this
interpretation has been so vigorous. One would therefore expect important
decisions in this area to seriously address these policies. The cases decided
during the 1988-89 Term, however, have not satisfied this expectation.
Indeed, Union Gas and its companion cases did not even seriously address
the open eleventh amendment issues that they supposedly resolved.30 Implicit
in the clear statement rule are the following conclusions about the eleventh
amendment:
(1) despite the wording of its text, the eleventh amendment is not juris-
,dictional. If the eleventh amendment were jurisdictional, Congress could
not alter it by legislative fiat;3
(2) the eleventh amendment is not limited to only diversity cases - as
four of the Court's current members espouse;
3 2
(3) the amendment is not a manifestation of a constitutionally-based
doctrine of state sovereign immunity - as four other members of the
Court maintain;"3 and,
(4) the eleventh amendment is not an expression of a common-law based
sovereign immunity.,,
These conclusions may or may not be correct, but there is little doubt
that they are highly controversial. Each conclusion resolves what has been
a deeply divided debate in academic circles, as well as within the Court
itself.3 5 It is unsettling enough that the Court answered this debate by resort
28. For an attack on the principle that constitutional rights may deserve more judicial
protection than statutory rights, see Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047, 2059-60 (1988) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
29. See Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 339.
30. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 297-
98 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring).
32. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
34. See Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part
One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 544 (1977); Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amend-
ment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1988).
35. For a list of some of the leading academic commentaries, see Chemerinsky, supra note
11, at 321 n.1.
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to little more than citing dicta from its previous decisions. When one
considers, however, that the dicta relied upon was simply part of the Court's
previous issue-avoidance strategy, the transformation of that dicta to con-
stitutional principle becomes even more disquieting.
Obviously, then, there is much that could be said in response to the 1988-
89 Term decisions. At the very least, a theoretical debate concerning the
underlying meaning of the eleventh amendment needs to be further explored.
Nevertheless, rather than offering a broad theoretical critique, I have a more
modest goal in mind for the remainder of this Essay. Specifically, I will
examine whether the Court's conclusion that Congress has the power to
abrogate a state's eleventh amendment immunity is consistent with its im-
position of a constitutionally required clear statement rule.
II. A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE COURT'S DECISION: PROCESS FEDERALISM
A. Process Federalism - the Court's Apparent Rationale
No matter how vociferously the Supreme Court's 1988-89 eleventh amend-
ment decisions are attacked, it cannot be said that the holding that Congress
may abrogate a state's eleventh amendment immunity is without support.
This conclusion has been strongly defended and probably represented at one
time "the prevailing academic view." '3 6 Actually, two distinct theories exist
which support the "congressional supremacist" position.
3 7
The first and earlier theory posits that the eleventh amendment was
intended only as a limitation on federal judicial power.3" Under this inter-
pretation, the eleventh amendment does not bar congressional action because
the eleventh amendment is irrelevant to the exercise of congressional power.
More recently, a second theory has been advanced which posits that a
state's eleventh amendment protection is akin to the protection accorded
states under the tenth amendment.3 9 According to this theory, both amend-
36. Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amendment
Survived the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon, 74 GEO. L.J. 363, 364 (1985). The diversity theory has since probably become the
dominant academic position. See Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425
(1987); Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construc-
tion of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction,
35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983). But see Marshall, The Diversity
Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1372 (1989).
37. Brown, supra note 36, at 364.
38. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State
Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1413, 1441-42 (1975); Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and
Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REV.
682, 693 (1976).
39. Brown, supra note 36, at 389-91.
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ments are concerned with the protection of state sovereignty. Unlike the
earlier congressional abrogation thesis, this theory posits that the eleventh
amendment does address congressional power, but that the protection it
provides to the states is similar to that accorded to the states under the tenth
amendment.-
The congressional supremacist position, as taken by the Court in the 1988-
89 Term decisions, appears to be most in accord with the second view. The
Court did not treat the eleventh amendment as irrelevant to the exercise of
congressional power as the first school would maintain .4 Rather, the Court
followed an analysis similar to that applied in recent tenth amendment cases.
The Court recognized that the states presented a cognizable constitutional
interest but held that interest could be overridden by congressional action.
4 2
In short, the Union Gas Court's holding that Congress may, under its
commerce power, subject the states to federal jurisdiction parallels the
Court's tenth amendment decision in Garcia v. Metropolitan Transit
Authority4a which held that Congress had the power to subject the states to
substantive federal regulation.
That there might be a relationship between a state's tenth amendment and
eleventh amendment protections had been raised prior to the 1988-89 Term.
In dissent, Justice Blackmun alluded to such a relationship in Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon." It was Professor George Brown, however, who
constructed the theoretical bridge between the two amendments .4  Relying
on the Court's rejection of the state's tenth amendment defense in Garcia,
Professor Brown accurately predicted that the Court would ultimately hold
that Congress had the constitutional authority to override the states' eleventh
amendment immunity.
46
The critical component in Garcia and Professor Brown's hypothesis is the
theory of process federalism.4 7 Process federalism assumes that the states do
40. Id. at 372-79. For criticism of the position, see Jablonski, The Eleventh Amendment:
An Affirmative Limitation on the Commerce Clause Power of Congress - A Doctrinal Foun-
dation, 37 DE PAUL L. REV. 547, 555 (1988); Jablonski, Does Garcia Preclude an Eleventh
Amendment Affirmative Limitation on the Congress's Commerce Clause Power, 23 U. RICH.
L. REv. 1, 4 (1988).
41. Justice Brennan alluded to this theory but he primarily focused on Congress's power
to abrogate state immunity, thus suggesting that he viewed the eleventh amendment as relevant
to the abrogation issue. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2283-84 (1989).
42. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2280-84.
43. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
44. 473 U.S. 234, 303 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting that "Court's Eleventh
Amendment cases spring from the same soil as the Tenth amendment jurisprudence abandoned
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority").
45. See Brown, supra note 36, at 393; see also H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDIC-
TION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 152 (1984).
46. See Brown, supra note 36, at 393.
47. The theory of process federalism has been most often associated with the writings of
Dean Jesse Choper and Professor Herbert Wechsler. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 172-74 (1980); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Feder-
19891
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not need judicial protection from purported encroachment by the federal
government because Congress, the legislative arm of the federal government,
is comprised of representatives from the various states themselves. As the
Court explained in Garcia:
[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the
States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government
itself. It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal
Government was designed in large part to protect the States from over-
reaching by Congress .... [Tihe fundamental limitation that the consti-
tutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the 'States
as States' is one of process rather than one of result. Any substantive
restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find its justi-
fication in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be
tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process
rather than to dictate a 'sacred province of state autonomy.
4
If one accepts Professor Brown's conclusion that the eleventh amendment
is a "narrow exemplification ' 49 of state sovereignty, the application of a
process federalism understanding to eleventh amendment issues easily fol-
lows. The conclusion that tenth amendment state sovereignty interests are
protected in the workings of the political process would necessarily mean
that the political process would also serve to protect the states' eleventh
amendment interests.5 0 Moreover, as Professor Brown argues, if Congress is
not barred from placing substantive regulations upon the states under the
tenth amendment, then it would seem that this general power "ought rea-
sonably to include the lesser power of determining how and where the
regulation is to be enforced."'"
All of this, of course, may not be quite so simple. Process federalism
itself has increasingly become the subject of attack on the dual grounds that
it unrealistically describes the extent that state interests are safeguarded in
the national political process and also that it fails to adequately protect the
values of federalism.12 Professor Brown's greater-subsumes-the-lesser argu-
alism, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 49-82 (1961); Choper, The Scope of
National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552,
1567-68 (1977); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 544
(1954).
48. Garcia v. Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. at 551-54 (citing J. CHOPER, supra note 47,
at 175-84; La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity
and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 779, 787 (1982); and, Wechsler,
supra note 47, at 558).
49. Brown, supra note 36, at 389.
50. Id.
51. Id. [hereinafter this theory is referred to as the "greater-subsumes-the-lesser argument"].
52. See Jackson, supra note 34, at 43; Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The
Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 849 (1979); Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism?
Congressional Response to Supreme Court Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 URB.
LAW. 301 (1988); McConnell, Federalism: The Founder's Design, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 1484,
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ment also presupposes that there are no peculiar problems associated with
subjecting the states to federal judicial power, as opposed to federal legislative
power. This in itself is a controversial assumption. 3 For our purposes,
however, the question is whether, even if process federalism's underlying
assumptions are accepted, the theory can be squared with a "clear statement
rule" applicable only to congressional action in derogation of state immunity
under the eleventh amendment.
B. Process Federalism and the Clear Statement Rule
To Professor Brown, the clear statement rule is "process [federalism] with
a bite." 54 Noting that Garcia did not wholly abandon the role of judicial
oversight in protecting the states, Brown argues that a "clear statement rule"
properly falls within the judicial role that Justice Blackmun alluded to in
Garcia. Judicial review under a clear statement formulation, for Brown, is
not substantive. It simply assures that Congress has focused upon the
implications of subjecting a state to federal jurisdiction. As Professor Brown
explains, "[i]f Congress is the only source of protection of the states'
interests, it does not seem unfair for the Court to force Congress to do its
job."
55
Yet there are anomalies and inconsistencies inherent in adopting a clear
statement rule, particularly as that rule manifests itself in the cases of the
1988-89 Term. First, the notion that Congress needs to be prodded to consider
states' interests seems fundamentally at odds with the notion of process
federalism itself. It essentially suggests that the legislators' allegiance and
duties to the interests of the states as states may not even rise to a level of
consciousness. Quite simply, it is at least incongruous to assume that Con-
gress, as a body comprised of representatives from the various states, au-
1485 (1987); Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After
Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341, 346-80. Justice Powell has also been a leading critic of the
Choper/Wechsler hypothesis. See Garcia v. Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 565-77 (1985)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
53. Jablonski, Does Garcia Preclude an Eleventh Amendment Affirmative Limitation on
the Congress's Commerce Clause Power, supra note 40, at 9 (arguing that states need greater
protection from federal judiciary because states are not represented in the federal courts as
they are in Congress).
54. Brown, supra note 36, at 365.
55. Brown, supra note 36, at 390. Professors Fink and Tushnet also make this point:
The Wechslerian political safeguards of federal approach justifies the imposition of
a clear statement requirement: if national legislators are to consider states' interests
effectively before overriding them in the service of a greater national interest, they
must be aware of the degree to which states' interests are at stake. The Court can
promise such awareness by forcing the process of drafting legislation to produce
proposals that signal their impact.
H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, supra note 45, at 142. Accord Jackson, supra note 34, at 110-111
(arguing a clear statement requirement may be advisable even if state immunity has no
constitutional component).
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tomatically protects states' interests if it is also assumed that Congress is
likely to ignore or overlook states' interests.
Second, the process federalism argument does not explain why there is a
clear statement rule for the eleventh amendment which is unique in its
stringently or, as Justice Brennan describes it, "more robust [in] its require-
ment for clarity [than] in any other situation.156 Why, for example, is there
a clear statement requirement for the eleventh amendment but not for the
tenth? Interestingly, Professor Brown's greater-subsumes-the-lesser argument
would suggest the reverse. If substantive regulation is a greater infringement
on state sovereignty than is merely subjecting the states to a federal forum,
this would suggest that more stringent procedural safeguards should accom-
pany the former, more intrusive, type of regulation. It is then the states'
tenth amendment interests, if any, which should require the most robust
"clear statement" protection. Yet, the Court has imposed no such require-
ment."
Of course, an argument can be made that the states should receive greater
protection in the eleventh amendment context because the states do not have
the direct representation in the federal judiciary that they do in Congress.
However, even this argument does not support a clear statement rule in
congressional abrogation cases. Although the federal courts are the ostensible
"beneficiaries" of the jurisdictional grant, it is still congressional action that
is at issue. Congress both provides the jurisdictional grant and retains the
power to remove it. The fact that states do not have representatives on the
federal judiciary is irrelevant to congressional allocation of federal jurisdic-
tion. 8
Third, a clear statement rule has been effectively criticized as a mechanism
that denies rather than advances congressional purpose. 9 A clear statement
rule, of course, negates normal rules of statutory inference. Indeed, it even
negates explicit indicia of legislative intent if that indicia is expressed in
general as opposed to specific language. As such, Professor Martha Field
has argued, "[w]hile the rule appears to be one of judicial restraint, it
effectively gives courts a veto . . . [they] can exercise when congressional
intent is clear but the legislation is not absolutely explicit." ' 60 If Professor
56. Will v. Michigan State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2314 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. See Garcia v. Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
58. One may argue that the eleventh amendment requires greater protection because the
effects of imposing jurisdiction on the states may not be as clear as the effect of imposing
substantive regulation. For example, in Garcia, the impact of subjecting the states to the Fair
Labor Standards Act could have been predicted when Congress passed the Act. On the other
hand, the effect of a general grant of jurisdiction against the states might not be as easy
ascertained. Note, that this argument at best only applies to general grants of jurisdiction and
not narrow statutorily confined grants of jurisdiction like that in Union Gas. When federal
jurisdiction is provided as a part of a specific program, its impact upon the states should be
no different than the program's substantive effect.
59. Chemerinsky, supra note 11 at 336-38.
60. See Field, supra note 11, at 1273.
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Field is right, then, it suggests yet another anomaly. If Congress has the
power to abrogate state immunity, why should the courts have the ability
to nullify that power by utilizing artificially stringent rules of statutory
construction?
Finally, the application of a-clear statement rule to legislation passed by
Congress pursuant to its powers under the commerce clause seems, at the
very least, incongruous with the absence of clear statement requirements on
legislation passed pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment. 6'
Prior to Union Gas, of course, the Court had held that Congress could
override state immunity under section five of the fourteenth amendment.
62
The question left open at that time was whether Congress also had such
power under the commerce clause. Becauie the fourteenth amendment was
explicitly directed at the states, 63 it might make sense to distinguish between
section five of the fourteenth amendment and the commerce clause as to
whether Congress has the power to override state immunity. However, there
is no basis for a distinction once the commerce power has been interpreted
as also allowing congressional abrogation. Moreover, it seems odd that a
distinction between section five and the commerce clause would take the
form of a clear statement rule. After all, if the clear statement requirement
is to assure that Congress does not overlook its responsibility to protect the
states, why should Congress have the constitutional power to act sloppily
pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment, but not to have that
right under the commerce clause? There is, of course, no sense to this
distinction.
III. CONCLUSION
In the cases during its 1988-89 Term, the Supreme Court finally resolved
one of the most important questions left open in current eleventh amendment
jurisprudence-whether Congress, under the commerce clause, had the power
to abrogate a state's eleventh amendment immunity from suit for damages
in federal court. The Court answered that question in the affirmative.
However, the Court qualified that power by requiring Congress to articulate
its intent to subject the states to suit in federal court through "clear and
unmistakable language" in the text of the statute. Unfortunately, the Court,
perhaps because it was badly fragmented, did not present an adequate
rationale for its decisions.
The Court's decisions, however, are not merely deficient because of their
failure to provide a tidy opinion. Rather, the Court's conclusions that: (1)
Congress can abrogate state immunity; but, (2) it needs a clear statement in
order to do so, do not blend easily with other aspects of state immunity
61. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-95 (1978).
62. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1979).
63. The amendment, in part, prohibits a state from making or enforcing "any law which
shall abridge the privilege of citizens." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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doctrine, or even with each other. If the states do not require substantive
protection from Congress because the states' own congressional representa-
tives stand guard over their interests, then there seems little reason why the
Court should require Congress to provide clear statements that it is doing
its job. Conversely, if a clear statement rule is necessary to force Congress
to perform its duties and protect the states, why does such a rule not also
apply to congressional actions taken under section five of the fourteenth
amendment? Indeed, why should the clear statement rule not apply to all
congressional actions affecting the states, including those arguably implicat-
ing the tenth amendment?
The Court has not provided satisfactory answers to these questions. Un-
fortunately, this is nothing new. Actually, the eleventh amendment cases of
the 1988-89 Term were simply "business as usual." The Court's eleventh
amendment jurisprudence remains "relentlessly ambiguous."
' '
64. Marshall, supra note 36, at 1373 n.5.
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